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INTRODUCTION
Nothing generates as much discord and emotion as sex. No wonder Virginia
Woolf once said, "when a subject is highly controversial-and any question
about sex is that-one cannot hope to tell the truth."' This warning seems
particularly poignant where the subject is one of the sexes selling sex-
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particularly when those selling it are women. Nevertheless, the debate that has
taken place in Europe and the United States in the last century over women's
prostitution/sex work 2 seems not to have heeded Woolf's call for argumentative
caution when discussing the sexes (and sex). Those who talk about
prostitution/sex work rarely recognize that "[o]ne can only show how one came
to hold whatever opinion one does hold," or "[o]ne can only give one's audience
the chance of drawing their own conclusions as they observe the limitations, the
prejudices, the idiosyncrasies of the speaker."
3 Quite the contrary, since at least
the Victorian uproar over "white slavery"4 at the end of the nineteenth century,
the legal, social, and political status of prostitution/sex work has ignited heated
disputes among those who advocate for its prohibition (by criminalizing both the
sale and purchase of sex), its one-sided criminalization (by criminalizing the
purchase of sex but not its sale), its regulation (with labor, health, security, or
zoning regulations, among others), or its complete decriminalization (treating
sex trade as any other trade).
Discussing prostitution/sex work (on any side of the debate), and particularly
how the state should respond to it, often becomes a conversation about the
meaning of human dignity, personal autonomy, equality, the market, and the
centrality of criminal law in the political community where the debate takes
place. Although such conversations may make appeals to the frameworks of
diverse political and philosophical theories, it is within the various strands of
feminism, queer theory, and trans studies that the debate over the distinct legal
approaches to prostitution/sex work has been most productive. These debates are
so rich and complex that it would be unfair and almost impossible to try to
2. Using "prostitution" or "sex work" to refer to the exchange of sexual intercourse for money is a
politically loaded choice. The former is the term typically preferred by prohibitionists and, in current
debates, is a synonym for sexual exploitation, slavery, or human trafficking. The latter term, used
by advocates of sex work regulation or decriminalization, designates a legitimate and lawfil form
of labor to be regulated by the state. Here, I use "prostitution/sex work" when I am referring to the
political debate over the exchange of sexual intercourse for money in the most general way, taking
into account both the perspectives of prohibitionist and pro-regulatory viewpoints without ascribing
to them their specific political valences. Consequently, when I use "prostitution" or "sex work"
without a slash connecting them, I am giving the term its specific political prohibitionist or pro-
regulatory sex work meaning. For a similar use of "prostitution/sex work" see Janet Halley et al.,
From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work,
and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARY. J. &
GENDER 335 (2006).
3, WooLF, supra note 1.
4. See generally JUDITH R. WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY: WOMEN, CLASS,
AND THE STATE (1980) (exploring the public discourse on prostitution in the late nineteenth century,
which, among other positions, involved prostitution being framed as white slavery).
5, Cf PETER DE MARNEFFE, LIBERALISM AND PROSTITUTION 28-30 (2010) (identifying four common
legal models of sex work as prohibition, abolition, regulation, and full decriminalization). In this
Article, the terms prohibition, one-sided criminalization, regulation, and complete decriminalization
are used in place of de Marneffe's terms, respectively. This alteration is meant to recognize the
unique historical and contemporary meaning of "abolition" in the United States, and especially the
incongruity of using the abolition label for an effort to criminalize the purchase of sex (even if these
movements may self-identify with this term).
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summarize them here. Although this Article does seek to participate in the
contemporary conversation about prostitution/sex work, it does not aim to adopt
a normative position in favor of prostitution/sex work's prohibition, one-sided
criminalization, regulation, decriminalization, or anything in between. Instead, it
aims to provide a foundation for describing one of the spaces where this debate
is currently unfolding in Latin America and, more specifically, in Colombia.
At a time when the concepts of global or transnational constitutionalism
have begun to take hold, complex political debates are increasingly framed as
potential judicial cases to be decided by supreme or constitutional courts around
the world.6 Prostitution/sex work is no exception. Both the advocates for
regulation of sex work and the prohibitionists have clothed their claims in the
language of rights, seeking judicial protections for the rights of sex workers or
for victims of sexual exploitation, slavery, or human trafficking. In this process,
"original" prohibitionist and pro-regulatory debates (originating in Europe and
the United States) are translated into the specific constitutional language of
particular domestic jurisdictions. Even this local specificity, however, has global
potential given the transnational nature of current constitutional conversations.
In this Article, I argue that the local specificity of the prohibitionist/sex work
regulation debate in Colombia has been the "sentimentalization" of the
Constitution through the mobilization of values such as dignity, autonomy, and
equality. Although the argument is geographically circumscribed, its elaboration
of the Constitution as an important affective terrain to dispute claims of social
justice may have a more global reach.
In Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Latin America, free adults willingly
participating in the exchange of sex for money have not generally been punished
through criminal law instruments. 7 Throughout the region, diverse regulations-
6. For more on the concept of global or transnational constitutionalism, its principles, and dynamics,
see, for example, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA (Rosalind Dixon &
Tom Ginsburg eds., 2017); CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST
TRIBUNALS OF INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA,ANDCOLOMBIA (Daniel Bonilla Maldonadoed., 2013); VICKI
C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010); THE LATIN
AMERICAN CASEBOOK: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND RIGHTS (Juan F. Gonzilez-Bertomeu &
Roberto Gargarella eds., 2016); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed.,
2007); KAI MOLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2012); THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA (Conrado ItIbner Mendes & Roberto
Gargarella eds., Oxford U. Press forthcoming 2020); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WrrH
JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE(2000); andALEC STONE SWEET& JUDMATHEWS,
PROPORTIONALITY BALANCING AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE AND
GLOBAL APPROACH(2019).
7. Since at least the 1930s, Latin American criminal law, in very general terms, has historically evolved
according to fairly "liberal" standards based on the idea that criminal law is the ultima ratio for
imposing social order. Criminal law is therefore a subsidiary means of social control that should
only be resorted to when other, less drastic forms of imposing social order have failed. This idea of
the criminal law strongly rejects the criminalization of conduct based on the supposed immorality
or intrinsic "dangerousness" ofthe agents. The decriminalization ofprostitution and homosexuality
is a preeminent example of this approach to criminal law. See, e.g., PEDRO PACHECO OSORO, 2
DERECI-O PENAL ESPECIAL 387-88 (1970); LUis CARLOS PEREZ, 5 DERECHO PENAL: PARTES
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varying from country to country-have been enacted to criminalize child
prostitution, coercion or inducement into prostitution, pimping, and other forms
of commercialized sex work.8 Beginning in 2002, however, Latin American
states began to ratify the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (known as the Palermo
Protocol), which supplemented the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.9 As countries adjusted domestic legislation to
comply with the Protocol through expedited legal reforms, a peculiar relationship
between human trafficking and prostitution emerged. This relationship is
derived, in large part, from the Protocol's inclusion of prostitution in its
definition of human trafficking, as well as the role that the Protocol assigns to
consent and agency. In article 3, the Protocol declares that human trafficking is
always exploitative and that one form of exploitation is "the exploitation of the
prostitution of others."'o The Protocol also states that in any case of "intended
exploitation," trafficking victims necessarily lack agency or consent. Thus, the
Palermo Protocol uses "exploitation" as the key concept through which it
establishes a link between human trafficking and prostitution, while declaring
that no person can consent to their own exploitation. By complying with the
Protocol's article 5 obligation to criminalize conduct related to human
trafficking, 12 several Latin American countries have not only introduced
criminal provisions that punish human trafficking per se, but also reformulated
their criminal legislation on pimping. 3 Without directly criminalizing the free
GENERAL Y ESPECIAL 65-73 (2ded. 1991);SEBASTIANSOLER,3DERECIO PENAL ARGENTINO316-
17 (1978); EUGENIO RAUL ZAFFARONI, ALEJANDRO ALAGIA & ALEJANDRO SLOKAR, DERECHO
PENAL: PARTE GENERAL (2d ed. 2002).
8. Id.
9. G.A. Res. 55/25, Palermo Protocol (Nov. 15, 2000).
10. Id. at art. 3.
11. Id.
12. Id. at art. 5.
13. For example, in Colombia, Law 1236 of2008 quintupled the sentence for those found guilty ofthe
crime of inducement into prostitution. See infra Section II.B. While the 2000 Criminal Code
established a sentence of two to four years of prison, the 2008 statute increased that sentence to a
prison term often to twenty-two years. In Argentina, statutory reforms undertaken after the signature
of the Palermo Protocol show even more clearly the relationship between human trafficking,
exploitation, and prostitution. In 2008, Law 26.364 ("Prevention and Punishment of Human
Trafficking and Assistance to its Victims"), in addition to creating the crimes of human trafficking
ofpersons above and under eighteen years ofage, established that one ofthe instances ofexploitation
included in the crime of human trafficking was the promotion, facilitation, development or
obtainment ofprofit "from any form of sexual commerce." Later, in 2012, Law 26.842 ("Prevention
and Punishment of-luman Trafficking and Assistance to its Victims") redefined the crime ofhuman
trafficking and established that one of the forms of exploitation of this crime is the promotion,
facilitation or commercialization of "a third party's prostitution or of any form of offer of another
person's sexual services." The most interesting feature of this statute, however, was the reform of
articles 125 his, 126 and 127 ofthe Criminal Code ofArgentina, which criminalized the promotion,
facilitation and economic exploitation ofthe prostitution ofany person even with her consent. Some
commentators have deemed this reform to be a "change of paradigm" in the Argentine conception
of pimping. See Javier Augusto de Luca & Valeria A. Lancman, Promocidn y facilitacian de la
prostitueidn, ASOCIACION PENSAMIENTO PENAL, CODIGO PENAL COMENTADO DE ACCESO LIBRE
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exchange of sex for money, these developments have drawn the scope of
criminal law so close to the transaction of sex that one may wonder whether the
exchange itself has been indirectly criminalized. In many jurisdictions
throughout Latin America, the close connection between human trafficking and
prostitution established by the Palermo Protocol seems to have produced a
synonymy.14
Parallel to these legal reforms, feminist scholars and women's civil society
groups in Latin America have demanded the criminalization of the purchase of
sex, less drastic prohibitionist measures not involving criminal law, or the
regulation of sex work as a lawful form of labor. 15Although these demands are
5, http:/www.pensamientopenal.com.ar/system/files/cpcomentado/cpc37752.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CL72-NZYH]. Before the reform, these acts were only criminally punished when
minors under the age of eighteen were involved, when the victim was of any age but "deceit,
violence, threat, abuse ofauthority or any other means ofintimidation or coercion were used or the
agent was an ascendant, spouse, sibling, tutor or the person in charge of her education or care," or,
in the case of exploitation of prostitution, when "deceit, coercive or intimidating abuse of a
relationship of dependence, authority or power, violence, threat, or any other means of intimidation
or coercion were used," In Mexico, the "General Statute for the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of the Crimes Related to Human Trafficking and for the Protection and Assistance to
the Victims of these Crimes" of2012 defines the crime ofhuman trafficking much in the same way
as the Palermo Protocol by establishing that the purpose of this crime is exploitation. One of the
modalities of exploitation is "a third party's prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation."
LGPSEDTP art. 10-111, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 14-06-2012. In this case, however,
differently from Argentina, the Mexican law does not automatically disregard the consent of the
victim. According to article 13 of the statute-except when minors or persons who do not have the
capacity to understand the meaning ofthe act are involved-the conduct of"whoever benefits from
the exploitation of one or more persons through prostitution, pornography, sexual public or private
exhibits, sexual tourism or any other paid sexual activity" is criminally punished only if there is
deceit, physical or moral violence, abuse ofpower, abuse ofa situation ofvulnerability, serious harm
or threat of serious harm, threat of reporting the victim to migration authorities or any other abuse
ofthe use ofthe law or legal procedures that leads the victim to submitto the agent.Id. at art. 13. In
a similar way, article 14 only punishes the deceit of persons to perform sexual services. Id. at art.
14.
14. This conflation is not specific to Latin America. As correctly observed by scholars devoted to the
study ofthe genealogy and the particular geopolitics ofthe Palermo Protocol, the internal dynamics
of the Protocol's negotiation and ratification led to the conflation of human trafficking with sex
trafficking, and sex trafficking with prostitution. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized
Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in
Contemporary Anti-Trafficking Campaigns, 36 SIGNS 45 (2010); Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing
Trafficking fom Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1658-59 (2010); Prabha Kotiswaran, BeyondSexual Humanitarianism: A
Postcolonial Approach to Anti-Trafficking Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 353, 357-58 (2014). This
Article seeks to show how the conflation takes on constitutional significance through particular
judicial interpretations, as well as some ofthe consequences ofthese interpretations.
15. For examples of prohibitionist organizations, activism, alliances, and feminist scholarship in Latin
America, see DIALOG: PROSTITUC6N/TRABAJO SEXUAL: LAS PROTAGONISTAS HABLAN (Lohana
Berkins & Claudia Korol eds., 2007); Diana Maffia, En la prostitucidn hay una relacin m6s
parecida a la esclavitud que at trabajo, LA RETAGUARDIA (Aug. 19, 2017),
http://www.laretaguardia.com.ar/2017/08/en-la-prostitucion-hay-una-relacion-mas.html
[https://perma.cc/XV8B-GU6GJ; Sonia Tessa, El cuerpo recobrado, PAGINA 12 (Mar. 9, 2012),
https://www.paginal2.com.ar/diario/suplementos/lasl2/13-7117-2012-03-09.html
[https://perma.cc/7ABS-VZ62] (interview with Lohana Berkins); and COALIC6N CONTRA EL
TRAFICO DE MUJERES Y NI&AS EN AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, http://www.catwlac.org/es
[https://perma.cc/3WCN-9F3X]. For examples of pro-regulatory sex work organizations, activism,
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based on one-sided criminalization or pro-regulatory arguments somewhat
similar to those that have circulated in Europe and the United States since the
end of the nineteenth century, the Latin American debate has been largely
informed by the emergence of human trafficking as an issue of international law.
This Latin American peculiarity has provided a space to show how the political,
legal, and socioeconomic status of prostitution/sex work can be discussed in
terms that are not those of the original Euro-American stances. This is
particularly true in countries like Colombia with an intense "constitutionalization
of everyday life,"1 where public debates in the streets, legislatures, executive
agencies, and courts over prostitution/sex work have extensively employed a
discourse of rights.
In this Article, I neither normatively evaluate nor seek to describe in detail
the relationship that the Palermo Protocol has established between human
trafficking, exploitation, and agency, or the legal reforms undertaken by Latin
American countries to comply with the Protocol. I also do not seek to defend
prohibitionist or regulatory frameworks for sex work in Latin America or
Colombia. Instead, my Article has two descriptive purposes. First, I provide a
theoretical reconstruction of the socio-political space that the international law
of human trafficking has created for debating the legal status ofprostitution/sex
work. I suggest that this space results from the combination of two phenomena.
The first is the inscription of human trafficking within a discourse of
"humanitarian reason," 17 grounded in an "economy of emotions,"S where
compassion, fear, and moral indignation operate as fundamental vectors for the
social and political mobilization of advocates claiming to speak on behalf of
victims of human trafficking and prostitution. The second phenomenon is the
development of a special form of humanitarian reason operating under the
framework of what Prabha Kotiswaran has called "sexual humanitarianism."'
9
This "sexual humanitarianism" calls for the "salvation" of victims of both
trafficking and prostitution, particularly in the Third World. In the space I
describe, I argue that even concepts such as victimhood and the economy of
and scholarship, see Marta Lamas, ,Prostitucion, trabajo o trata? Por un debate sin prejuicios, 50
DEBATE FEMINISTA 160 (2014); Valentina Montoya Robledo, Trabajadrasexualo 'victima
perfecta'?Limitesen elacceso a lajusticia, IMI PRISMAJURiDICO 143 (2012); ASOCIACIONMUJERES
MERETRICES DE LA ARGENTINA, https://www.amnmar.org.ar [https://perma.ce/9TLR-G9K8]; RED
DE MUJERES TRABAJADORAS SEXUALES DE LATINOAMIRICA Y EL CARIBE,
https://www.redtrasexorg [https://perma.ce/74C7-WH7Q]; and ASMUBULI [Asociacidn de
Mujeres Buscando Liberad, TWITTER, https://tvitter.com/asmubulilang=es (Colombia).
16. See Esteban Restrepo-Saldarriaga, Reforma constitucional y progreso social: la
"constitucionalizacibn de la vida cotidiana" en Colombia, in EL DERECHO COMO OBJETO E
INSTRUMENTO DE TRANSFORMACIN 73-88 (2003).
17. See DIDIER FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE PRESENT (2012)
[hereinafter FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON].
18. See Didier Fassin, Les &onomies morales rdvisities, 6 ANNALES HSS 1237 (2009) [hereinafter
Fassin, Les dconomies morales rdvisities].
19. See Kotiswaran, supra note 14.
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compassion do not necessarily dictate a subordinating reality for prostitutes/sex
workers. My analysis of the political and social dynamics produced in this
affective space makes two points. First, as some have already pointed out,2 0 the
discourse of compassion tends to displace other possible languages for justice.
But second-and this is important relative to the first point-there may be
redistributive and emancipatory dimensions to the mobilization of an economy
of compassion and the social category of victinhood. Analyzing the extent to
which these points manifest requires an analysis of the costs and benefits
associated with the mobilization of an economy of compassion in specific
political situations and contexts.
Based on this theoretical reconstruction, the second Part of the Article is
devoted to an analysis of the Colombian Constitutional Court's doctrine on
prostitution/sex work and human trafficking. Here, I show how the ratification
of the Palermo Protocol and the peculiar brand of sexual humanitarianism this
process has instantiated have led to the "sentimentalization" of Colombian
constitutional law, demonstrating what occurs when the language of compassion
encounters the language of rights. More precisely, my argument examines the
extent to which the Court's project of recognizing sex work as a form of lawful
labor has been impacted by the sedimentation of an economy of compassion
entrenched in the constitutional values of dignity, autonomy, and equality. I
show how-the apparently progressive logic ofrecognizing sex work as a form of
lawful labor operates against a background of sexual humanitarianism, which is
more typically associated with a prohibitionist political project. Constitutional
developments for prostitution/sex work in Colombia have thus taken place in a
domain governed by values that, because of their sentimentalization, may
simultaneously sustain both pro-regulatory and prohibitionist political projects.
1. HUMANITARIAN GOVERNANCE AND SEXUAL HUMANITARIANISM
Much has been written about the rise of a type of political action grounded
in affects, such as compassion and pity, that domestic governments, some civil
society organizations, and international institutions feel for victims who suffer
the effects of armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters, and
other catastrophic events.21 Rather than summarize the extensive literature on
this topic, in this Part I argue that the features of this "humanitarian reason," as
Didier Fassin has called it, have reached into the world ofsex, resulting in a form
20. See Lauren Berlant, The Sulfect of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 105-33 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); see also DDIER
FASSIN & RICHARD RECHTMAN, THE EMPIRE OF TRAUMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONDITION OF
VICTIMHOOD (2009).
21. See FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON, supra note 17; see also COMPASSION: THE CULTURE AND
POLITICS OF AN EMOTION (Lauren Berlant ed., 2004); Berlant, supra note 20.
2020] 51
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
of "sexual humanitarianism." At the center of"sexual humanitarianism" is the
political mission to rescue and protect victims of sexual violence and
exploitation. In contrast with some commentators who posit that the concept of
the victim of sexual exploitation, which in the Palermo Protocol encompasses
the prostitute as well as the victim of human trafficking, is an inherently
disempowering image of a person lacking any agency, I argue that in certain
political conditions and contexts, the socio-political concept of victimhood can
provide emancipatory possibilities. I assert that the very vulnerability of the
condition of victimhood can be a space for political resistance. But if this is so,
the mobilization of victimhood in specific political debates would need to be
substantiated with an analysis of the costs and benefits of its use.
Didier Fassin has highlighted how moral sentiments have become an
"essential force" of both domestic and international politics since the end of the
twentieth century.22 Fassin has described "humanitarian reason" as a "general
logic" whose fundamental feature is the appeal to a "moral economy" in which
mobilization and political decision-making are based on compassion for the
suffering of victims of catastrophic events and other situations. For Fassin, this
form of politics, with its "goodness" often taken for granted, has a history that
must be understood in order to expose what is at stake when compassion
becomes the fundamental mode of administering "precarious lives," such as
those of the poor, immigrants, refugees, sick children, or victims of amed
conflicts and natural disasters.2
4 For the purposes of this Article, Fassin's
genealogical analysis offers two key elements.
First, the discourse of compassion has come to replace other discourses that
have historically been employed to frame, contest, and confront social injustices.
Under the logic of humanitarian reason, "[ilnequality is replaced by exclusion,
domination is transformed into misfortune, injustice is articulated as suffering,
violence is expressed in terms oftrauma."
2 5 A critical approach to humanitarian
reason as a mode of governance in our world does not imply, in and of itself, a
negative judgment about such an appeal to compassion. It is rather an invitation
to gauge carefully the effects of the competition that emerges between this and
other possible discourses of justice in the particular contexts of different
injustices. Thus, one may approach particular social struggles or political
decisions by investigating and weighing the costs and benefits of framing the
injustice in terms of compassion or in the language of an alternative discourse of
justice.2 6 At the same time, one must never lose sight of the fact that compassion
often creates a paradoxical relationship between the person who feels
22. FAsSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON, supra note 17, at 1.
23. Fassin, Les conomies morales rdvisitees, supra note 18; see also FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON,
supra note 17, at 7, 244.
24. FAsSrN, HUMANITARIAN REASON, supra note 17, at.4-8.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 8.
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compassion and the person who is the object of it. For Fassin, this relationship
is intrinsically unequal, for it generates neither reciprocity nor true recognition:
Although the one who feels compassion generally proceeds in all good will, the
suffering subject who is the object of compassion can only reciprocate through
displays of humility. 2 7 This asymmetry poses at least two important problems.
For one, the political space of compassion can, at times, easily turn into one of
repression-as has happened, for example, in the case of immigrants or asylum
seekers.2 For another, political relations founded on compassion may often
devolve into "humanitarian melodrama," creating and promoting images of the
"intimate details" of human pain and suffering, circulated by the media and
political actors, which have become the most visible and distinctive
characteristic of political action in our time.2 9
The second element of Didier Fassin's genealogical reconstruction of
humanitarian reason is the "empire of trauma," which centers on those who,
because of their suffering, have become objects of compassion with a political
identity that Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman interrogate. Fassin and
Rechtman show how, between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1960s,
the social concept of victimhood evolved from that of a condition suggesting
personal weakness and inviting suspicion and distrust, to the production of an
object of compassion whose suffering is viewed as authentic and, as such, a
source of unquestionable truth and moral authority. 30 According to their
genealogy, one becomes a victim through an external, uncontrollable, and
unpredictable event that results in trauma. The concept of trauma, which initially
emerged in psychiatry and psychoanalysis where it was understood to be limited
to the psyche of individuals, has thus been transformed into a social phenomenon
that informs contemporary moral economies and activates collective political
mobilization for rights in the name of compassion and empathy.I
Fassin and Rechtman's genealogical reconstruction does not condemn,
32discard, or negatively evaluate in normative terms victimhood or trauma.
Rather, they call for a contextual analysis of the uses and mobilizations of this
condition. In their view, in specific cases, the mobilization of the victim
condition may have emancipatory effects, lead to recognition of rights, or instill
positive social and political transformations in public policy that would not be
possible through other languages of justice. 3Here, Fassin and Rechtman
coincide with feminist theoretical elaborations that have highlighted the
27. Id. at 3-4.
28. Id. at 14, 16.
29, Berlant, supra note 20; see also FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON, supra note 17, at 250; ROBERT
MEISTER, AFTER EvIL: A POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 66-67 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
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possibilities for political resistance stemming from the position of victimhood
and the idea of vulnerability that is (often negatively) associated with it.
3 4
Feminist authors, however, have also warned about the risks associated with
political struggles clothed in the language of victimhood. They argue that even
if victimhood could be used to support the demand for rights (and may therefore
have positive political outcomes), its origin in a purely individual psychic
phenomenon, when translated into collective struggles, may tend to obscure
injustices of a structural nature. As Fassin and Rechtman rightly observe, any
analysis of the use and mobilization of victimhood cannot ignore the fact that,
when choosing this course of action, "other possible schemes of description and
action" are set aside that could be more effective and powerful in confronting
and transforming structural injustices.
The concepts of "humanitarian reason" and the "empire of trauma" have
taken on special meaning in the world of sex, and especially in contemporary
debates on human trafficking and prostitution/sex work. Some feminist critics
have used "sexual humanitarianism" as a concept to describe, in general terms,
the emergence of a global movement seeking to save victims of sexual
exploitation (including both victims of human trafficking and prostitutes),
particularly those in the "Third World." 3 7 In large part, this use of the concept
replicates in a specific context Gayatri Spivak's famous criticism of the
relationship between the First and Third Worlds as one defined by "white men"
(and, in the context of sexualhumanitarianism, also white-and often feminist-
women) saving "brown women."38 For radical critics of sexual humanitarianism,
the concept is mobilized as an example of the West's idealized vision of a
sexualized Other located in remote and exotic places inhabited by "pure,"
"perfect," "iconic," or "ideal" victims of various forms of sexual exploitation
and oppression whose positions are often linked to "cultural backwardness."
39
34. See REBECCA STRINGER, KNOWING VICTIMS: FEMINISM, AGENCY AND VICTIM POLITICS IN
NEOLIBERAL TIMES (2014); Judith Butler, eynep Gambetti & Leticia Sabsay, Introduction, in
VULNERABILITY IN RESISTANCE I (Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti & Leticia Sabsay eds., 2016).
35. Berlant, supra note 20, at 108-09; see also FASSIN & RECHTMAN, supra note 20, at 281; Butler,
Gambetti & Sabsay, supra note 34, at 2-3.
36. FASSIN & RECHTMAN, supra note 20, at 9.
37. See Nick Mai, Between Embodied Cosmopolitanism and Sexual Humanitarianism: The Fractal
Mobilities and Subjectiities of Migrants Working in Sex Industry, in BORDERS, MOBILITIES AND
MIGRATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN, 19-21ST CENTURY 175 (Lisa Anteby-
Yemini et al. eds., 2014); see also PRABHA KOTISWARAN, DANGEROUS SEX, INVISIBLE LABOR: SEX
WORK AND THE LAW IN INDIA (2011); Bernstein, supra note 14; Kotiswaran, supra note 14.
38. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURE 271, 297 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988); see also Shani D'Cruze &
Anupama Rao, Violence and the Vulnerabilities ofGender, 16 GENDER& HIST. 495 (2004); Ratna
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subject in
International/Post-ColonialFeminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2002).
39. See Moshoula Capous Desyllas, A Critique ofthe Global Trafficking Discourse and U.S. Policy, 34
J. SoC.& SOC. WELFARE 57 (2007); Julietta Hua & HollyNigorizawa, US Sex Trafficking, Women s
Human Rights and the Politics ofRepresentation, 12 INT'LFEMINIST J. POL. 401 (2010); Mai,supra
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The object of this critique is embodied by the image of "[t]he third world sex
worker enslaved in a big-city brothel."40
Critics also highlight the paradox ofsexual humanitarianism. At first glance,
sexual humanitarianism appears to be driven by compassion for victims of sexual
misfortune. Paradoxically, it often devolves into the control and suppression of
the migration of undesirable populations through the enforcement of restrictive
immigration laws that, in many cases, transform the "perfect" victim of human
trafficking into the less than perfect woman "guilty" of prostitution. 'In other
instances, however, critical approaches to sexual humanitarianism have
undertaken the type of analysis suggested by Didier Fassin's genealogical
approach to humanitarian reason and the empire oftrauma, while centering their
analysis on the fundamental role played by the Palermo Protocol in the global
diffusion of sexual humanitarianism. For these critics, the social condition of
sexual victims-the primary objects of protection for the Protocol-does not
necessarily equate with domination and repression. In some cases, the condition
can be mobilized in an emancipatory manner to produce improvements in the
living conditions of victims of human trafficking and those who engage in sex
work.4 2 The analysis of the extent to which such dynamics occur in specific
contexts should take into account at least four elements.
First, in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Palermo Protocol,
two camps intensely debated the relationship between human trafficking and
prostitution/sex work. While some feminist camps defended one-sided
criminalization of prostitution, other feminist groups and human rights advocates
43
championed the regulation of sex work. Inasmuch as the Protocol reflects a
compromise between both political projects, its domestic incorporation and
enforcement may support radically divergent public policies towards sex work
(simultaneously justifying, for example, both criminal and regulatory policies).44
Second, and despite the first point, in many countries around the world
(particularly in the Global South), implementation of the Palermo Protocol has
tracked the particular political position adopted by the United States vis-a-vis
human trafficking and prostitution. Under the George W. Bush administration,
influenced by far-right U.S. Christian groups, human trafficking became a highly
note 37; Jayashri Srikantiah, Peket Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic
Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157 (2007).
40. Kotiswaran, supra note 14, at 354.
41. Desyllas, supra note 39; Mai, supra note 37; see also MILENA JAKC, LA TRAITE DES ETRES
HUMAINS EN FRANCE: DE LA VICTIME IDEALE A LA VICTIME COUPABLE (2016).
42. See, e.g., JAKIC, supra note 41; Chuang, supra note 14; Halley et al., supra note 2; Kotiswaran,
supra note 14; Mai, supra note 37; Srikantiah, supra note 39.
43. See, e.g., KOTISWARAN, supra note 37; Bernstein, supra note 14; Chuang, supra note 14; Joe
Doezema, Now You See Her, Now You Don't: Sex Workers at the UN Trafficking Protocol
Negotiations, 14 Soc. & LEGAL STUD.61 (2005); Halley et al., supra note 2; Kotiswaran, supra
note 14.
44. Halley et al., supra note 2.
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moralized and sexualized issue increasingly tethered to calls for prohibitionist
policies towards prostitution. This conflation of human trafficking and
prostitution has since spread internationally as the United States has conditioned
the availability of funds for international cooperation on the compliance of
recipient countries with the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act.4 5 Third, the fact that the Palermo Protocol, because of its unique genesis,
focuses its protective measures on the "perfect" victim of sexual exploitation,
leads to a constant conflation of trafficking with trafficking for sex work, and
trafficking for sex work with sex work. This conflation has spurred domestic
modalities of implementation that ignore trafficking not for the purposes of sex
work while criminalizing freely chosen forms of sex work. 
4 6 Fourth, the
Protocol's emphasis on criminalization foregrounds a conception, which some
scholars call "neoliberal,"47 that sexual exploitation is the result of the individual
actions of deviant actors and not of structural poverty, which forces certain
populations to migrate in conditions of insecurity in search of informal work. In
this sense, the Palermo Protocol, grounded in a discourse of compassion and
suffering, tends to obscure structural injustices and displace alternative
discourses of justice that would promote broader distributive reforms.
4 8
45. Id.; 22 U.S.C. § 7101; Kotiswaran, supra note 14; Yvonne C. Zimmerman, From Bush to Obama:
Rethinking Sex and Religion in the United States' Initiative to Combat Human Trafficking,26J.
FEMINIST STUD. RELIGION 79 (2010).
46. See Bernstein, supra note 14; Kotiswaran, supra note 14, at 357.
47. Critical scholars from different disciplines have noted the tendency of neoliberalism to tackle
structural injustices through "individualist" solutions. While some of these solutions tend to
reconstruct or bolster the individual autonomy of subjects so they become more "resilient" and
therefore ableto cope with their misfortunes, otherproposals tendto ascribe individual responsibility
(sometimes as criminal liability) for structural injustices to specific individuals whose actions are
said to represent the general dynamics of the unjust structure. The idea of criminalizing pimps or
clients of prostitutes/sex workers (supposedly representing the sexist structures that subordinate
women through the expropriation of their sexuality) fits within this second trend. Cf ANTI-
IMPUNITY ANDTHE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller & D.M. Davis eds.,
2016) (asserting that the turn to criminal punishment in human rights law constricted responses to
human rights violations as well as conceptions of justice and peace); JUDITH BUTLER, NOTES
TOWARD A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF ASSEMBLY (2015) (discussing the possibilities of resisting
current global capitalism through the politicization ofvulnerability and the exposure ofbodies); Jean
Comaroff& John L. Comaroff, Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming, 12 PUB.
CULTURE 291 (2000) (describing "millennial capitalism" as based on consumption in opposition to
original capitalist ideas based on production); Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal
Law in Human Rights, 100 CORNELLL. REv. 1069 (2015) (discussing critically how human rights
law has turned to criminal law as its main compliance strategy); Luis Eslava & Lina Buchely,
Security and Development?: A Story about Petty Crime, the Petty State and its Petty Law, 67
REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS SOCIALES 40 (2019) (describing "neo-punitive" strategies in developing
countries aimed at countering structural inequality through emotional interventions in the lives of
vulnerable subjects); Alice M. Miller & Tara Zivkovic, Seismic Shifts: How Prosecution Became
the Go-To Tool to Vindicate Rights, in BEYOND VIRTUE AND VICE: RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 39 (Alice M. Miller & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2019) (discussing the risks
ofexpanding criminal law's harmprinciple in the field ofgender, sexuality, and reproduction); Mark
Neocleous, Resisting Resilience, 178 RADICAL PHIL. 2 (2013) (discussing how resilience, far from
fostering resistance or liberation, is a form ofdisciplining and controlling populations).
48. See Chuang, supra note 14; Kotiswaran,supra note 14.
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Both Didier Fassin and some of the feminist critics of sexual
humanitarianism have deployed their respective frameworks in ethnographic
analyses of concrete cases. Their studies have shown how, in some cases, the
concepts of humanitarian reason, compassion, trauma, victimization, and sexual
exploitation can produce positive transformations in the lives of people who are
treated as victims and objects of compassion. However, in other cases, the studies
have found that these same concepts can produce contradictions and few or no
emancipatory effects in the lives of those for whom the concepts are mobilized.
In this Article, I do not undertake an ethnographic exercise of this nature. Rather,
I examine an important question left open by Fassin. Fassin, you will recall,
believes that although contemporary moral economies of compassion and
victimization are not, in themselves, negative or pernicious, they may displace
other discourses for justice that, in certain cases and contexts, might be more
productive for challenging and dismantling structural injustices. While Fassin
observes that compassion may create an unequal relationship between the
compassionate and those who are objects of compassion in such a manner that
the recipient of compassion's compelled humility can substitute for and displace
a genuine demand for rights,4 9 he also observes that, in other cases, certain social
groups who organized around their victimhood status have achieved important
recognitions of rights.5 0 Fassin thus seems to suggest that one of the languages
for justice that discourses of compassion and victimhood may either obscure or
promote is the discourse of rights. In the following Part, I attempt to show what
49. FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON, supra note 17, at4.
50. FASSIN & RECHTMAN, supra note 20, at 10.
51. An analysis of this sort to be more fully developed in future versions of the arguments elaborated
in this Article-would seek to show the costs and benefits of framing a given political struggle for
emancipation in terms of compassion and, more precisely, of translating compassion into specific
constitutional rights. This "affective analysis" could complement the kind of "distributional
analysis" practiced by influential critical scholars since the 1980s. See generally GOVERNANCE
FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE FIELD (Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, RachelRebouch6 & Hila
Shamir eds., 2019) (assessing the limitations of feminist engagement with the state and its
bureaucratic apparatus); JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOWAND WHYTO TAKE A BREAKFROM
FEMINISM (2006) (arguing for the need to take a break from feminism in order to more fully
conceptualize sexuality); JANET HALLEY, PRABHA KOTISWARAN, RACHEL REBOUCHIE & HILA
SHAMIR, GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: AN INTRODUCTION (2018) (explaining how feminism made
inroads into the state apparatus); DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004) (discussing the blind spots in structural advocacy
generated by international humanitarian engagement); DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE:
How POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016) (discussing the
role of experts in current global governance); Karen Engle, Huian Rights Consciousness and
Critique, in A TIME FOR CRITIQUE 91 (Didier Fassin & Bernard E. Harcourt eds., 2019) (discussing
how critics of human rights deal with the fear of destroying progressive political projects through
their critiques); Halley et al., supra note 2 (asserting that feminist achievements have formulated a
"governance feminism"); Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroicization of
Domination, 26 NEW ENG.L.REV. 1309, 1311 (1992) (analyzing the possibility of transcending the
gender regime offered by "the eroticization of domination"). For useful and insightful examples of
feminist distributional analysis in Latin America, see HELENA ALVIAR GARCIA & ISABEL CRISTINA
JARAMILLo StERRA, FEMINISMO Y CRITICA JURIDICA: EL ANALISIS DISTRIBUTIVO COMO
ALTERNATIVA CRiTICA AL LEGALISMO LIBERAL (2012); ISABEL CRISTINA JARAMILLO SIERRA &
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occurs when humanitarian reason-embodied in the form of sexual
humanitarianism-expresses itself in terms of constitutional principles and
rights. I focus on the doctrine of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, which
has established a complex relationship between human trafficking, prostitution,
and sex work.
II. THE SENTIMENTAL CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIAN SEXUAL
HUMANITARIANISM
To understand how sexual humanitarianism has shaped the relationship
between prostitution, sex work, and human trafficking in Colombian
constitutional law, I divide the Constitutional Court's doctrine into three
periods.5 2 In the first period, from 1995 to 1997, prostitution emerged for the
first time as a social phenomenon of constitutional relevance. Although it was
clear to the Court that prostitution could be clothed in the language of rights, the
Court more closely approximated a vision of prostitution as a dangerous and
immoral activity. Between 2009 and 2010, humanitarian reason and sexual
humanitarianism made a critical entrance into Colombia's constitutional
doctrine, complicating and transfonning the Court's understanding of
prostitution as the Court began to associate the phenomenon with both human
trafficking and lawful sex work. In the third period, from 2015 to the present, the
Court has reinforced a characterization of sex work as a fully legal form of labor
while failing to depart entirely from the project of sexual humanitarianism. In
this Part of the Article, I briefly describe the first period before embarking on a
critical analysis of the Court's jurisprudence in the second and third periods.
A. Prostitution as an1mmoral and Dangerous Activity
Two decisions from 1995 and 1997 define the first period of Colombian
constitutional doctrine regarding prostitution/sex work. This period is important
because its approach to prostitution has only been partially reevaluated by the
apparently progressive jurisprudence of later periods. In this period, the Court
ruled on two constitutional injunctions (acciones de tutela) 54 initiated by
TATIANA ALFONSO SIERRA, MUJERES, CORTES Y MEDIOS: LA REFORMA JUDICIAL DEL AORTO
(2008); and ISABEL CRISTINA JARAMILLO SIERRA, DERECHO Y FAMILIA EN COLOMBIA: HISTORAS
DERAZA, GtNERO Y PROPIEDAD (1540-1980) (2013).
52. The Court itself established a similar periodization. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], febrero 6, 2017, Sentencia T-073/17, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
relatoria/2017/t-073-17.htm [https://perma.cc/WQ7D-NS8R] [hereinafter CCC2017].
53. See infra Section IIC and note 85.
54. The accidn de tutela is a judicial injunction established by the Colombian Constitution specifically
to protect findamental rights. It lacks stringent formalities and can be initiated by any person before
any judge. It is similar to the amparo of other Spanish-speaking Latin American countries and the
Brazilian mandado de seguranga.
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plaintiffs who sought protection of their fundamental rights affected by
streetwalking and the operation of, in their words, "brothels, white slavery, and
sleazy bars." 5 At the outset, the Court found "historical and sociological
evidence [that] demonstrates that prostitution is a phenomenon that cannot be
completely and totally eliminated," and therefore that the state must "tolerate"
prostitution "as a minor evil," because it "will inevitably continue" despite
efforts to combat it.5 6 This purely pragmatic assertion was the starting point for
an understanding of prostitution in terms of constitutional rights that took two
primary forms.
The first form, focusing on those who engage in prostitution, began with an
understanding of the activity as one that is inherently undesirable, "because
trading in one's own being is contrary to human dignity."5 7 Some statements
highlighted the inherent immorality of prostitution. The Court found that "living
a life of virtue ... requires a minimum level of well-being, which cannot exist
where the world of vice reigns supreme" (referring to red-light districts), and that
prostitution is a "bad example," a "wretched occupation," and an "essentially
and evidently immoral activity."58 Nevertheless, and together with the
characterization of prostitution as an activity that offends human dignity, the
Court also observed in the same decision that "legally speaking, the right to the
free development ofpersonality allows people to adopt prostitution as a way of
life," 5 9 and in the second decision from the period, that "[t]his Court does not
intend to ignore the right to thefee development ofpersonality enjoyed by the
prostitutes and transvestites in this case.' 0
The simultaneous description of prostitution in terms of both human dignity
and personal autonomy (or the fundamental right to the "free development of
personality") suggests that, in this first period, the Court believed people could
freely choose to engage in immoral occupations that impaired their own dignity.
This idea of human autonomy is fully consistent with the second constitutional
understanding of prostitution from this period, which focused on the rights of
others affected by prostitution. The Court, in a move compatible with its doctrine
on the fundamental right to the free development of personality, noted that
people have the freedom to engage in prostitution as long as it does not affect the
rights of third parties. These were exemplified in the first case as "the rights of
children," "family intimacy," and "the rights of others to peacefully live in their
place of residence."6 In the second case, the examples included the right to
55. C.C., diciembre 14, 1995, Sentencia T-620/95, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
relatoria/1995/T-620-95.htm [https://perna.cc/F4RH-T68Q] [hereinafter CCC 1995].
56. Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id
59. Id (emphasis added)
60. C.C., septiembre 25, 1997, Sentencia SU-476/97, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.
co/relatoria/1997/SU476-97.htm [https://perma.cc/2DGH-ZJBN] [hereinafter CCC 1997].
61. CCC 1995.
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"life," "physical and moral integrity," "tranquility and security," and "living in
dignified and just conditions."6
2 The list of rights cited by the Court reinforced
the idea that, in spite of being an activity that one can choose with full autonomy,
prostitution's inherent immorality nevertheless tends to corrupt the virtue of
especially vulnerable social groups, such as children and the elderly, while
presenting, in general terms, a threat to public order. The Court stated that "it
would be unfair to expose children to a sexually promiscuous environment," that
"public authorities have a paramount interest in protecting the virtue of
childhood,"6 3 and that it is intolerable "that children be helpless witnesses to the
performance of acts [of streetwalking] harmful to their innocence and
modesty."64
The characterization of prostitution as a freely chosen immoral activity that
corrupts virtue and threatens public order had two main implications for public
policy: increasing police presence in prostitution zones and refusing to recognize
prostitution as sex work. First, the claim that "prostitution is a minor evil, that is
to say, something that should be tolerated, but that is recognized as harmful"
65
implied the need for establishing greater police presence in zones of prostitution.
Although the Court noted that prostitution is legal, it nevertheless cautioned that
prostitution inherently keeps "public order in a state of disturbance" and is tied
to "constant outbreaks of insecurity and the frequent commission of crimes
against life, personal integrity, property and moral integrity of residents and
passersby." The Court also suggested that those who engage in it "evidently
sexually harass and attack unsuspecting citizens . .. making them victims of
robbery, assault, threats, and serious attacks on modesty," and that it cannot "be
ignored that this is an activity around which crimes are often committed and
venereal diseases spread."
6 6
Second, given its characterization of prostitution, the Court was far from
willing to take any steps to recognize prostitution as a form of legally protected
labor. In its view, "if the goal is to prevent, by any means available, that women
prostitute themselves," one must necessarily conclude that "it would be incorrect
to treat prostitution as honest work, worthy of legal and constitutional
protection, since it is, by essence, an evidently immoral activity. Honest work is
an ethical activity because it perfects the worker, provides personal fulfillment,
and produces a material good."
67
To understand the changes to the Court's position on prostitution with the
emergence ofsexual humanitarianism from 2009 onwards, it is important to have






67. CCC 1995 (emphasis added).
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Constitutional Court. First, the Court initiated a doctrine that framed
prostitution-and, later, sex work-in terms of human dignity and personal
autonomy (or the fundamental right to the free development of personality).
While prostitution was seen, on the one hand, as an assault on dignity because
the sale of one's body is contrary to this value, on the other hand, personal
autonomy was thought to allow the free choice of immoral occupations that
offend human dignity as long as such choices do not affect the rights of third
parties. Note that, here, the autonomy of the actor who decides to engage in
prostitution was not seen as limited, curtailed or obscured by any sort of external
relation or structure that systematically deprives prostitutes of their agency. For
the Court, the choice to prostitute oneself was treated as any other free choice
only limited by its effects on the rights of others. Most importantly, the prostitute
was not a victim who inspired compassion. Quite the contrary, prostitution
victimized those who had to bear the consequences of an immoral activity that
tends to erode public order. These victims were those who are particularly
vulnerable and impressionable: children, the elderly, and "unsuspecting"
passersby and neighbors who were forced to witness public exhibitions of sex.
The second feature of this first period's doctrine was the complete absence of
any the language of equality in the description of prostitution. The Court made
no indication that prostitutes are a vulnerable or marginalized social group
requiring special protection from the state. Finally, from a public policy
perspective, the Court believed that the state should respond to prostitution, first,
through police activity aimed at counteracting its harmful effects on the rights of
third parties and, second, by denying any sort of labor law protection to those
who engaged in its practice. The concept of sex work endowed with full legal
protection was thus completely absent from the constitutional doctrine of this
period.
B. Prostitution as Human Trafficking
After the first period, prostitution disappeared from Colombian
constitutional doctrine for twelve years.6" The second period, starting in 2009,
68. Ina 1999 case dealing with the constitutional validity of a provision of the military forces' internal
disciplinary regime, which established that it was an offense against military honor to associate
oneself or to maintain relations with "antisocial individuals like drug addicts, homosexuals,
prostitutes, and pimps," the Court held it unconstitutional to refer to "homosexuals" and
"prostitutes" as "antisocial in themselves."In the Court's view, "prostitution and homosexuality are
indeed valid sexual options in our Social Rule of Law (Estado socialde derecho). Those who have
chosen this way of life without affecting the rights of others cannot therefore be subjected to any
form of discrimination." The Court then added that "to the contrary, according to the Constitution,
their [i.e., homosexuals' and 'prostitutes'] status as free and autonomous individuals must be fully
guaranteed and recognized by the legal system as equal with respect to all members of the
community." C.C., julio 14, 1999, Sentencia C-507/99, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
relatoria/1999/c-507-99.htm [https://pema.cc/KK6B-4YRB]. Until the emergence of the notion of
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and following, the ratification of the Palermo Protocol in 2004, marked the
appearance and consolidation of sexual humanitarianism in Colombian
constitutional law. In the ideological and rhetorical transition from the first to the
second period, those who engaged in prostitution were no longer identified as
dangerous social undesirables-who could, nevertheless, freely choose this
occupation- but rather as sex workers and, at the same time, victims of sexual
exploitation. In this Section, I argue that this paradoxical status was the result of
the simultaneous operation of the pro-riminalization approach underlying
sexual humanitarianism and the countervailing calls for sex work to be treated
as fully lawful and regulated labor. These two projects, however, did not deploy
their rhetorical and political forces with equal success. In my view, the
constitutional doctrine of this period prioritized the political-affective space of
sexual humanitarianism as a framework within which calls for the regulation of
sex work as a form of lawful labor were subsumed. Sex work as lawful labor
thus makes its appearance in Colombian constitutional jurisprudence only in the
shadow of sexual humanitarianism. Under such a sentimentalized constitution-
one aimed at saving those who engage in prostitution because they are seen as
victims of sexual exploitation-it has become difficult to lay the foundations for
sensible public policies that promote sex work as a form of lawful labor.
The paradoxical view of those engaging in prostitution as both sex workers
and victims of sexual exploitation seems to emerge from the fact that sexual
humanitarianism and the moral economy of compassion and victimization
emerged in Colombia in the context of the criminalization of pimping. In a 2009
decision that set the ideological, rhetorical, political, and affective tone of this
period, the Constitutional Court upheld a provision of Colombia's Criminal
Code that had established the crime of "inducement into prostitution" (inducci6n
a la prostitucin). In its original 2000 drafting, this criminal provision
punished any person who induced another into prostitution "for profit or to
satisfy the desires of another" with a prison sentence of two to four years." Note
that the inducing agent need not proceed through the use of force, violence, or
any other form of coercion. The plaintiff argued that precisely because this crime
did not entail the use of force or violence, the provision was in violation of the
sex work in Colombian constitutional doctrine, this decision was considered the most progressive
and least prejudiced analysis of prostitution by the Court.
69. For an alternative critical take on this decision based on a "preservation-through-transformation"
analytical framework, see Esteban Restrepo-Saldarriaga, Poisoned Gfis: Old Moralities under New
Clothes?, in BEYOND VIRTUE AND VICE: RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 199-
219 (Alice M. Miller & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2019).
70. Article 213 of the 2000 Colombian CriminalCode was amended by Law 1236 of 2008. See supra
note 13. In its current version, it states: "Article 213. Inducement into Prostitution. Whoever induces
another person into carnal commerce or prostitution for profit or to satisfy the desires of a third
party, will be subjected to a prison sentence of ten to twenty-two years and a fine of sixty-six to




constitutional principle of personal autonomy (or the fundamental right to the
free development of personality). If the alleged victim responded to the induction
by freely deciding to engage in prostitution, the inducing agent could not
possibly have infringed upon any protected constitutional value. Based on an
argument that invoked human dignity and limited the reach of personal
autonomy, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs claims and upheld the statute.7 1
Undertaking a proportionality test, the Constitutional Court held that the
crime of inducement into prostitution pursued a constitutionally legitimate end
since it aimed to protect the dignity of those who engage in prostitution. The
Court noted that "any action encouraging another to engage in prostitution is
equivalent to encouraging this person to defile her own dignity" and added that
"in principle, it is therefore legitimate for the State to criminally punish the
person who promotes prostitution by making a business of it." 72 The premise that
engaging in prostitution impairs human dignity was the same as it was in the first
period of the Court's sex work jurisprudence; that is, "prostitution is not
desirable, because trading in one's own being is contrary to human dignity."7 3
The Court nevertheless attempted to remove from this justification any negative
moral judgment condemning prostitution itself (recall that, in 1995, the Court
labeled prostitution an "essentially and evidently irmroral activity" and a
"wretched occupation"). The Court observed that while in the past the crime of
inducement into prostitution protected "collective sexual morality or people's
sexual honesty," today it "is often considered to protect the value of human
dignity." 7 4 Individual human dignity thus became the engine of the state's
obligation to eliminate prostitution. And while, in the first period, the elimination
of prostitution depended on police forces controlling corollary activities of
public disorder arising out of the imnorality of prostitution, in the second period
the Court reached directly into criminal law as an instrument o prevent people's
sale of their bodies.
There are multiple and contested meanings of human dignity in the context
of sexuality, 7 and those meanings can be mobilized to validate both
reproductive and non-reproductive sex. Thus, one may question whether the
Constitutional Court can disestablish the link between the principle of human
dignity and a specific moralistic vision of sexuality it had established in 1995 by
merely asserting that a criminal statute prohibiting inducement into prostitution
guarantees human dignity. That is, because of the multiplicity of meanings of
71. C.C., septiembre 16, 2009, Sentencia C-636/09, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
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"human dignity," the concept cannot independently support both the idea that
prostitutes betray their dignity by trading their bodies and the idea that
criminalizing inducement preserves the prostitutes' dignity. The question,
however, seems to be answered by the Court's discussion of the relationship
between personal autonomy and prostitution and, particularly, by the arguments
the Court offered for invalidating the consent of those who decide to engage in
prostitution after being induced into the activity. Here, the premises of sexual
humanitarianism that establish an intimate association between (and at times
conflate) prostitution and human trafficking provided the argumentative weight
of the opinion. The Court affirmed that the "the impugned criminal provision is
a legal device created by Congress to combat prostitution and human
trafficking," and that, "[b]eyond the moral dilemma stemming from the
commercial exploitation of genitality and sexuality, prostitution is associated
with the crime ofhuman trafficking."7 6 Although the criminalization of inducing
another into prostitution is not strictly a measure of one-sided criminalization as
it does not punish those who pay for sex, the reasons offered by the Court to
validate the crime, based on the Court's strong association of prostitution with
human trafficking (which completely cancels the agency of the person who is
induced into the act), were strikingly similar to the arguments historically
advanced by those who advocate for one-sided criminalization.
The association of human trafficking and prostitution has been key to
constructing sexual humanitarianism's "perfect victim"--one who fits the image
of "[t]he third world sex worker enslaved in a big-city brothel,"
7 7 or the
languishing Fantine ofVictor Hugo's Les misrables. In associating trafficking
with prostitution, the Court relied on the international law of human trafficking
as well as documents from different United Nations bodies to prove the
inevitable ties that exist in fact between transnational organized crime, human
trafficking, and prostitution. According to the Court, these ties necessarily imply
that prostitution always takes place in conditions of exploitation that border on
slavery. The Court drew its most decisive normative argument in support of this
chain of relationships from article 3 of the Palermo Protocol. In its view, this
provision "establishes that human trafficking is a crime intimately related to
prostitution" and, given this close relationship, the Court concluded that "the
crime of inducement into prostitution can be committed even if the victim
expressly consented."78 Interpreting international law on human trafficking thus
allowed the Court to create a factual situation that, in turn, operated as the central
argument for rejecting the notion that people may freely decide to engage in
76. CCC 2009 (emphasis added).




prostitution, going so far as to highlight the "fallac[y]" of "the real willingness
of the decision to become a prostitute."
The "fallacy of agency" that, according to the Court, affects people
consenting to engage in prostitution is not only construed through the normative
conflation of human trafficking, transnational organized crime, and prostitution,
but also through a peculiar description of the contexts in which prostitution often
takes place. Based again on international reports and documents that
characterized prostitution as a modern form of slavery, the Constitutional Court
observed that prostitution tends to occur exclusively in contexts of
socioeconomic destitution. The Court noted, for example, that "the reports
previously cited . .. notably show that, in many cases, the initial consent of the
victim becomes her entryway into networks ofslavery and human trafficking, in
true 'cycles of violence' from which it is impossible to escape," and that "an
initial consent, vitiated by necessity or ignorance, is highly susceptible to
becoming a coercive restraint," concluding that the criminalization of inducing
someone into prostitution "is even more relevant in countries like Colombia,
whose social problems are fertile ground for needy people to resort to
prostitution as a means of survival."80 Here, one might ask whether the reference
to consent "vitiated by necessity or ignorance," and "countries like Colombia"
with their "social problems" and "needy people," function as colonial metonyms
to designate a conception of the Third World as a space whose conditions of
inevitable poverty and "cultural backwardness" imply that those who engage in
prostitution-as a result of their dire poverty-can only do so as sex slaves. By
combining a particular interpretation of the international law of human
trafficking with its "empirical" verifications, the Court produced a victim of
inducement to prostitution who, by her intrinsic vulnerability, lacked all
autonomy to freely decide whether to engage in prostitution.
In constructing the "perfect victim" of prostitution, the Constitutional Court
inscribed the basic premises of sexual humanitarianism at the center of the
constitutional principles of human dignity and personal autonomy. The moral
economy of compassion lying at the heart of humanitarian reason operated as the
engine of the Court's institutional mobilization to eradicate prostitution in the
name of human dignity. Recall that, according to well-established constitutional
doctrine, state authorities have a duty to eliminate prostitution "because trading
in one's own being is contrary to human dignity." 8 The Court drew the indignity
of prostitution from the act's inherent immorality in its first period. But in the
second period, "trading in one's own being" was not problematic for moral
reasons, but because the people who participate in this trade lack the freedom to
oppose their sexual exploitation (or even their "slavery") due to their intrinsic
79. Id
80, Id (emphasis added).
81. CCC 2009; CC 1995.
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vulnerability. Under the premises of sexual humanitarianism, the offense to
dignity was the exploitation that had become associated with prostitution.
Human dignity became not only the constitutional space for whole institutional
structures to "feel" compassion for the victims of sexual exploitation, but also
the main catalyst for state action aimed at saving them. Note, however, that the
salvation mission aimed neither to improving the socioeconomic destitution of
those who engage in prostitution, nor to transform the unjust social and
institutional structures that produce poverty and destitution and, as such, are the
origin of the social vulnerabilities driving the moral economy of compassion.
Instead, the Court found criminal law to be the institutional vehicle to serve
the idea of the state as savior of victims of sexual exploitation. When the Court
invalidated the agency of those induced into prostitution by conflating
prostitution with sexual exploitation and slavery (such that inducing another into
prostitution is criminal even where the victim "freely" yields to the inducement),
it seemed to legitimize a modality of paternalistic criminal law seeking to prevent
a person with no agency (due to her condition of extreme socioeconomic
vulnerability) from inflicting harm upon her own dignity through an act that
mimics a true decision.82 Compassion for victims of prostitution, nested in the
constitutional principle of human dignity, saw the criminal law apparatus as their
salvation.
Drawing on the insights of Didier Fassin and feminist critics of sexual
humanitarianism, one may wonder whether this particular institutional
mobilization of compassion, despite its presumption that those who choose
prostitutionas a way of life are always victims of sexual exploitation (or slavery),
could nevertheless offer a space for social resistance or foster emancipatory and
positive transformations in the socioeconomic status of people who engage in
prostitution.83 It does not seem, however, that criminal prosecution of an
82. I am well aware of the theoretical complexities of paternalism as a justification for criminal
punishment. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG HARM TO SELF (1986); Douglas Husak, Penal Paternalism,
in PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013). My
argument here, however, is not meant to establish whether the crime ofinducement into prostitution
is a legitimate form of criminal paternalism; rather, it is directed at understanding how the
Colombian criminal law of procurement and pimping has been transformed by the premises of
sexual humanitarianism.
83. My argument fully recognizes the fact that people who choose prostitution/sex work as an
occupation often make their decision in conditions of limited autonomy. The socioeconomic
contexts in which these decisions are made are indeed often plagued by poverty and limited
employment opportunities, among other structural factors. Ifthese conditions were different, people
who engage in prostitution/sex work would perhaps choose another form of survival. Cf Scott A.
Anderson, Prostitution and SexualAutonomy: Making Sense ofthe Prohibition ofProstitution, 112
ETHICS 748 (2002) (making an argumentthat supports the prohibition ofprostitution in the name of
sexual autonomy that takes into account both liberal and radical feminist arguments). Nevertheless,
that these decisions take place within conditions of limited autonomy does not mean that
prostitution/sex work is always performed in conditions of exploitation/slavery. The literature on
how agency and autonomy are transformed under conditions of structural inequality is extensive.
For general elaborations of this problem from diverse disciplinary perspectives see, for example,
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004);
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individual pimp provides a space for the person who was induced into
prostitution to politicize her social vulnerability in a way that would transform
her structural conditions of socioeconomic precariousness. The inherent
dynamics of criminal law and procedure, aimed at establishing the individual
criminal liability ofa specific person charged with having induced another into
prostitution, where the victim is not at the center of the proceedings, do not seem
to offer a space powerful enough to contest-let alone dismantle-unjust social
structures that lead people to choose prostitution as an occupation. Likewise,
criminally punishing a single pimp is far from obtaining decisive redistributive
effects within these social structures. 84 In sum, the brand of sexual
humanitarianism that seeks to save victims of exploitation by criminally
punishing pimps charged with inducing people into prostitution does not seem
to be an emancipatory use of the moral economy of compassion or the concept
of victimhood.
This observation could perhaps be countered by a more charitable reading
of the Court's opinion. Indeed, one could argue that in its constitutional
validation of the crime of inducement into prostitution, the Court was only
LAUREN BERLANT, CRUEL OPTIMISM (2011); ANGELA CAMPBELL, SISTER WIVES, SURROGATES
AND SEX WORKERS: OUTLAWS BY CHOICE? (2016); ELIZABETH A. POVINELL, ECONOMIES OF
ABANDONMENT: SOCIAL BELONGING AND ENDURANCE IN LATE LIBERALISM (2011); ELIZABETH
A.POVINELLI, THE EMPIRE OF LOVE: TOWARD A THEORY OF INTIMACY, GENEALOGY, AND
CARNALITY (2006); and RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY,
AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). Many
empirical studies on prostitution/sex work around the world tend to indicate the diversity and
complexity among these activities, the motivations of those who engage in prostittition/sex work,
the relations between prostitutes/sex workers and procurers and pimps, and the procurers and pimps
themselves. Scholars devoted to the empirical study ofprostitution and other forms ofsex work tend
to warn against generalizations concerning the conditions in which, in our times, people engage in
prostitution/sex work. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bernstein, The Meaning ofthe Purchase: Desire, Demand,
and the Commerce ofSex, 2 ETHNOGRAPHY 375 (2001); Susan Dewey, The FeminizedLabor fSex
Work: Two Decades of Feminist Historical and Ethnographic Research, 9 LABOR 113 (2012);
Mathew A. Foust, Sex and Seghood: What Feminist Philosophy Can Learn from Recent
Ethnography in Ho Chi Minh City 14.INT'L WOMEN'S STUD. 31 (2013); Prabha Kotiswaran, Born
Unto Brothels: Toward a Legal Ethnography ofSex Work in an Indian Red-LightArea, 33 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 579 (2008); Ronald Weitzer, The Growing Moral Panic over Prostitution and Sex
Trafficking, 30 CRIMINOLOGIST 2 (2005); Ronald Weitzer, Human Trafficking and Contemporary
Slavery, 41 ANN. REV. Soc. 223 (2015); Ronald Weitzer, The Mythology ofProstitution: Advocacy
Research and Public Policy, 7 SEXUALITY RES. & Soc. POL'Y 15 (2010); Ronald Weitzer, Sex
Trafficking and the Sex Industy: The Need for Evidence-Based Theory and Legislation, 101 .CRIM
L.& CRIMINOLOGY 1337 (2012); Ronald Weitzer, Sociology ofSex Work, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 213
(2009).
84. These are quite intuitive, tentative, and general ideas about the limited potential ofcriminal law and
prosecution to debunk and transform structural inequality. See generally ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, supra note 47 (asserting that the turn to criminal punishment in human
rights law constricted responses to human rights violations as well as conceptions ofjustice and
peace); Engle, supra note 47 (discussing critically how human rights law has turned to criminal law
as its main compliance strategy); Miller & Zivkovic, supra note 47 (discussing the risks of
expanding criminal law's harm principle in the field ofgender, sexuality, and reproduction). A more
elaborate and contextual analysis, based on a combination of "distributional" and "affective"
analysis, see supra note 51, may reveal benefits of criminal prosecution for the politicization of
vulnerability in specific cases.
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referring to one of many institutional avenues available for public authorities to
eradicate prostitution. A possibility would therefore be left open for the
implementation of other non-criminal public policies explicitly aimed at the
transformation of the unjust socioeconomic structures that lead people to choose
prostitution as a form of survival.
C. Prostitution as Sex Work
This latter possibility becomes relevant when considering the legal and
political trajectory of the Constitutional Court's doctrine since 2010, as it has
begun to frame prostitution as sex work.85 The Court inaugurated this
constitutional doctrine in a 2010 case brought by a sex worker who was fired by
the owner of the bar where she worked after she became pregnant. She alleged
that, even if a formal labor contract was never signed between her and the owner
of the bar, the conditions under which she had conducted her sex work were
those of a labor contract, which entitled her to all the rights and benefits
stenuning from a fully legal employment relationship. As a remedy for the
unlawful termination of her labor contract, she requested that the defendant
reinstate her and pay her lost wages, social security benefits, and maternity
leave.86
For the first time in its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court held that the
recognition of prostitution as a form of sex work is an obligation imposed on
public authorities by the substantive equality clause of the Colombian
Constitution. According to the Court, the social prejudices that have historically
viewed prostitution as an immoral and shameful activity have contributed to the
discrimination and social marginalization of those who engage in it. Recognizing
prostitution as sex work subject to the regulations of labor law is thus a measure
to confront and transform the unjust socioeconomic structures that have cast
those who engage in prostitution as second-class citizens. This characterization
of sex work from the perspective of the constitutional principle of substantive
equality did not entail, however, a simultaneous reconsideration of the Court's
doctrine on the duty of public authorities to eradicate (what is now called) sex
work as an activity that offends human dignity, nor the prominent role of
criminal law in fulfilling that duty. The Court itself acknowledged this tension.
85. The Constitutional Court has restated this doctrine in three decisions. In these opinions, in addition
to securing a legal framework of prostitution as fully legal sex work, the Court has elaborated on the
idea that those who choose this type ofwork are vulnerable social groups in need ofspecial treatment
by public authorities (particularly the implementation of public policies concerning sex work by








86. C.C., agosto 13, 2010, Sentencia T-629/10, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/
2010/t-629-10.htm[https://perma.cc/7LM5-SUGG].
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In its view, the current doctrine articulates "a regime . . . aimed at pursuing
dignity and liberty and the elimination of any form of exploitation of people and
women" which has created a "permanent tension between the desire to eliminate
[sex work] through criminal prohibition and punishment and the desire to
recognize the rights of the people who engage in [sex work] and confer express
legalization for this activity." 8 7 The way in which the Court attempts to operate
within this "tension" suggests that, given the force of its precedent on the crime
of inducement into prostitution, the tension becomes almost irresolvable.
In this decision, the Court not only reaffirmed its doctrine on the crime of
inducement into prostitution but also reinforced the close link between human
trafficking and sex work. It held that "[n]o form of sex work may [be permitted
to] threaten the liberty and human dignity of any of the participants in the
relationship" and added that "[tihis definitive condition on the exercise of ...
private autonomy takes on greater significance . . . in light of [international]
reports showing how sex work has become increasingly connected to human
trafficking, sex tourism, and forced prostitution."8 8 However, the Court opened
up new avenues distinct from its previous doctrine by recognizing that there is a
space for the performance of prostitution as lawful sex work, wherever it is
possible to ascertain all parties' "complete and persistent free and informed will,
particularly that of the person selling sex." 8 9 The coexistence of the close
connection between prostitution and human trafficking (supporting the use of
criminal law to eradicate prostitution) and the idea that there is space for the
legitimate performance of sex work regulatedby labor law wherever sex workers
have consented in "complete and persistent" fashion with a "free and informed
will," is especially significant in this case. It is here where the tension noted by
the Court becomes an intractable (if not irresolvable) problem. Indeed, reading
the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence in light of the fact pattern of the case, it
seems possible to argue that employing someone in a bar to provide sexual
services in exchange for a previously agreed-upon salary and under conditions
of labor subordination is a form of inducing another into prostitution.
In its decision, the Court claimed that a person who employs another as a
sex worker in a bar does not commit the crime of inducement into prostitution,
though it provided little coherent reasoning to justify this claim. On the one hand,
the Court held that the crime of inducement into prostitution prohibits a business
owner from "any act that induces another into prostitution in order to generate
profit or to satisfy the desires of another, even if done without coercion." On the
other hand, the Court asserted that the prohibition against "promoting sex work
in order to stimulate one's business" is only "an additional restriction for those
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their business by means different from the promotion of sex work.
90 In view of
these rather obscure statements, it remains to be seen whether it is in fact possible
to develop the (lawful) business of lending sexual services without "promoting
the performance of sex work."
The haphazard nature of this standard is even more evident in light of the
decision's central holding. According to the Court, framing sex work as a
manifestation of constitutional principles of human dignity, liberty, and
substantive equality leads to the "inexorable conclusion" that a labor contract
(guaranteeing all labor law rights and benefits) exists between the owners of
commercial establishments that sell sexual services and the sex workers who
provide these services. While the criminal law of pimping-premised on sexual
humanitarianism-prohibits the owners of businesses who legally sell sexual
services from developing their commercial activity through the promotion ofsex
work, the labor law regime of sex work-based on substantive equality-seems
to legitimize the promotion of sex work by recognizing the existence of a labor
contract between those same entrepreneurs/employers and their sex workers. The
implementation of a truly egalitarian project to transform unjust structures of
socioeconomic distribution through a broad recognition of sex work will only
succeed through the full retreat of criminal law-animated as it is by sexual
humanitarianism-from free (non-violent and non-coerced) transactions for
sexual services. By failing to renounce sexual humanitarianism's central
premises, the Court's egalitarian project of recognizing sex work lost some (or
even all) of its transformative power.
Another important holding of this decision reinforces this conclusion. After
recognizing the existence of a labor contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant, the Court held that the owner of the bar had illegally terminated the
contract in violation of the special constitutional protection afforded to pregnant
employees. As a remedy, the Court ordered the payment of lost wages, social
security benefits, and maternity leave. However, the Court expressly declined to
order the reinstatement of the plaintiff to her former job as a sex worker. In its
view, the state's obligation to eradicate sex work in the name of human dignity
precludes judges from recognizing the right of sex workers to be reinstated in
their jobs in cases of illegal termination of labor contracts. For the Court,
"because of the particular nature of sex work, which, in many aspects, degrades
dignity, just as the power of the employer over the employee is limited, the right
of the workerto employment stability and to be reinstated to her position in cases
of unjust dismissal is also limited."9 '
Here, the saving hand of sentimentalized dignity prevents the reinstatement
of a sex worker who was illegally dismissed from her job. In effect, this denial
of the right to be reinstated "saves" those who perform an activity that, in spite
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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of its legality, allegedly degrades their dignity. Although it recognizes the
legitimacy of sex work, the Court's doctrine does not seem capable of ridding
itself of the basic premise of sexual humanitarianism: that selling sex always
borders on sexual exploitation. If the Court itself has acknowledged that people
may choose to be sex workers in a "free and reasoned" way, there is no reason
not to allow a person to decide, in a "free and reasoned" way, to continue
engaging in sex work after being illegally fired. Only the logic of sexual
humanitarianism explains, again, why the transformative potential of the
recognition of sex work as a legal form of labor is constrained by the failure of
the Court to recognize the right of sex workers to be reinstated.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of sexual humanitarianism in Colombia through the
domestic incorporation of the Palermo Protocol has sentimentalized Colombian
constitutional law, allowing the moral economy of compassion to permeate
principles of human dignity and personal autonomy. Colombia's constitutional
experience therefore seems to indicate that when this moral economy operates in
the discourse of rights, it has only limited potential to transform unjust structures
of distribution. Although substantive equality seems to offer an important
platform for the recognition of sex work as a legal fonn of labor, sexual
humanitarianism rooted in human dignity and personal autonomy tends to limit
the transformative and emancipatory possibilities of this project. Although the
movement for criminal regulation of prostitution in Colombia has not been
entirely successful, the dynamics of Colombian constitutional doctrine onhuman
trafficking, prostitution, and sex work seem to offer fertile ground for
prohibitionism to thrive. This would be to the detriment of the more empowering
project of structural transformation entailed by recognizing prostitution as a
legitimate and lawful form of sex work.
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